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ABSTRACT
We study how firm characteristics evolve from early business plan to initial public offering to public
company for 49 venture capital financed companies.  The average time elapsed is almost 6 years.
We describe the financial performance, business idea, point(s) of differentiation, non-human capital
assets, growth strategy, customers, competitors, alliances, top management, ownership structure, and
the board of directors.  Our analysis focuses on the nature and stability of those firm attributes.  Firm
business lines remain remarkably stable from business plan through public company.  Within those
business lines, non-human capital aspects of the businesses appear more stable than human capital
aspects.  In the cross-section, firms with more alienable assets have substantially more human capital
turnover.
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Since Coase (1937), economists have attempted to understand why firms exist and what constitutes 
firms.
1  Despite the long history of theory and empirical work, there is little systematic or non-case evidence 
concerning what constitutes a firm at birth and how a firm evolves from birth to mature company.  In this 
paper, we provide such evidence by studying 49 venture capital-financed firms from early business plan to 
initial public offering (IPO) to public company (three years after the IPO).   
This exercise has two goals.  First, we provide a systematic description of the early life and evolution 
of an important sample of firms.  Second, we consider how our findings can be interpreted in relation to 
existing theories of the firm and what new theories might try to explain. 
Our analysis begins with the identification and classification of firm characteristics when the firms 
are very young (at the time of an early business plan).  Fewer than half the sample firms have revenues at 
that time.  For each sample firm, we describe the financial performance, business idea, point(s) of 
differentiation, non-human capital assets and technology, growth strategy, customers, competitors, alliances, 
top management, ownership structure, and board of directors.  We then consider how firm financial measures 
and firm characteristics evolve by describing the firms at the IPO and at the third annual report after the IPO.  
We pay particular attention to measuring if those characteristics remain constant, change, or disappear.   
After describing the initial characteristics and evolution of these firms, we examine two cross-
sectional relationships.  We consider the relation between human capital turnover and the nature of firm 
assets.  Then, we consider the division of value between human and non-human capital assets by estimating 
the determinants of founder ownership.   
In describing the initial characteristics of firms and how they evolve, we try to shed light on different 
theories of the firm.  While some of these theories are motivated by specific examples or cases, we provide 
some of the first systematic and (relatively) large sample evidence on these issues. 
Several theories emphasize the difference between non-human and human assets.  For example, the 
basic assumption of the Hart-Moore framework is that firms are defined by their non-human assets.  In the 
                                                           
1 Both Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) and Gibbons (2004) describe and summarize some of this work.   2
words of Hart (1995), “a firm’s non-human assets, then, simply represent the glue that keeps the firm 
together, whatever this may be … Control over non-human assets leads to control over human assets… If 
non-human assets do not exist, then it is not clear what keeps the firm together.” (p. 57).  Holmström (1999) 
comes to a similar conclusion, but argues that firm ownership of non-human assets allows the firm to 
structure internal incentives and to influence external parties (e.g., suppliers) who contract with the firm.  
Two aspects of our analysis address these theories.  First, we try to identify the “glue” that holds 
firms together and determine the extent to which the glue derives from non-human or human assets.  Second, 
to the extent that the theories are static theories (in that they assume a non-human asset or glue already 
exists), we provide evidence as to the stage of a firm at which the glue emerges or “sticks” and how the 
“glue” evolves over a firm’s life cycle. 
We also relate our results to theories of the firm that emphasize the existence of specific assets or 
resources that are critical to the firm’s evolution and growth.  In particular, Wernerfelt (1984) and Rajan and 
Zingales (2001b) focus on critical resources.  A critical resource may be a person, “an idea, good customer 
relationships, a new tool, or superior management technique.”  According to these theories, a “firm is a web 
of specific investments built around a critical resource or resources…  At some point, the critical resource 
becomes the web of specific investment itself.” [Zingales (2000)].  One can interpret this latter statement as 
something of a dynamic theory.  By examining firms’ resources (non-human and human assets) early in their 
lives and over time, we shed light on the nature of critical resources and the periods in which they are 
critical.   
  The theories above (as well as others such as Hart and Moore (1994)) also have implications for how 
rents are divided between providers of human (founders) and non-human capital and the ability of firms to 
raise outside financing.  When specific human capital is more crucial, these models suggest that the specific 
human capital will capture more of the rents and make it more difficult to finance firms.  With our data, we 
estimate the magnitude of the rents retained by specific human capital (founders) and the relation of those 
rents to the nature of the firms’ assets.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
   3
This analysis also sheds light on the “new firms” described in Zingales (2000) and Rajan and 
Zingales (2001a).  They argue that today’s new firms differ from the old, traditional firms of the (early) 20
th 
century.  Old firms are “asset-intensive and highly vertically integrated … [their] boundaries are clear cut 
and sufficiently stable that one can take them for granted.”  New firms, on the other hand, tend to be “non-
vertically integrated, human capital intensive organizations operating in highly competitive environments.”  
Rajan and Zingales (2001a) argue that alienable assets – assets that can be assigned or pledged to other firms 
– have become less important relative to human capital and inalienable assets (e.g., business processes or 
knowledge).  In fact, Zingales (2000) suggests that in today’s corporations “human capital is emerging as the 
most crucial asset.”   
Related to the theoretical questions concerning the role of human and non-human capital assets is an 
old and ongoing debate among venture capitalists (VCs).  Some VCs believe that the company’s business 
and market are the key determinants of success while others believe that the key determinant is the 
company’s management team.  While VCs try to invest in companies with both strong businesses and strong 
management (see Kaplan and Strömberg (2004)), different VCs claim to weigh one or the other more heavily 
at the margin.  For example, Donald Valentine of Sequoia Capital, the VC investor in Cisco, is a well-known 
proponent of the business / market view.  Others favor the best available management team view.  Quindlen 
(2000) discusses these two views from the VC perspective (p. 33-35).  This debate is often characterized as 
whether one should bet on the jockey (management) or bet on the horse (the business / market). 
Our results can be summarized as follows.  The companies in our sample experience dramatic 
growth in revenue, assets, and market capitalization, but do not become profitable.  While the companies 
grow dramatically, their core businesses appear remarkably stable.  Only one firm changes its core line of 
business in the sense that the company produces a different product or service, or abandons its initial market 
segment to serve a different one.  Rather than changing businesses, firms typically maintain or broaden their 
offerings within their initial market segments.  The firms also sell to similar customers and compete against 
similar competitors in the three stages of the life cycle we examine.  This suggests that the firms’ business 
lines become fixed or elemental at a relatively early stage in a firm’s life cycle.     4
Almost uniformly, firms claim that they are differentiated by a unique product, technology, or 
service at all three stages of the life cycle we examine.  At the same time, however, the stated importance of 
expertise (which one might interpret as specific human capital) declines.  Roughly half of the firms stress the 
importance of expertise at the business plan while fewer than 15% do so by the IPO and third annual reports.  
With regard to non-human capital assets, firms stress the importance of proprietary intellectual 
property (IP), patents, and physical assets in all three stages.  Patents and physical assets become increasingly 
important over time. 
While the points of differentiation, alienable assets, customers, and competitors remain relatively 
constant, the human capital of the sample firms changes more substantially.  At the time of the annual report, 
one-half of the CEOs at the business plan remain; only one-quarter of the next four top executives remain.   
At this point, the results provide some insight into the Hart-Moore-Holmström view that a firm must 
be organized around non-human capital assets.  Consistent with this view, we find that non-human capital 
assets form very early in a firm’s life.  Identifiable lines of business and important physical, patent, and IP 
assets are created in these firms by the time of the early business plan, are relatively stable, and do not 
change or disappear as specific human capital assets turn over.  
This should not be interpreted as saying that specific human capital is unnecessary or unimportant.  
Obviously, a specific person has to have the initial idea and start the firm.  Proprietary, but non-patented 
intellectual property is indeed critical to many firms.  In contrast to non-human assets, however, the 
importance of specific people and initial expertise diminishes early in the firm’s life cycle.  Once the firm’s 
non-human assets are established, it seems possible (and not unusual) to find other people to run the firm.
2   
These findings also have implications for the critical resource theories.  The early emergence and 
stability of non-human assets are consistent with those assets being critical resources.  The instability of the 
human assets suggests that to the extent that the initial critical resource is a specific person or founder, the 
“web of specific investments built around the founder(s)” itself becomes the critical resource relatively early 
in a firm’s life.    
                                                           
2 For evidence consistent with this, see Bertrand and Schoar (2003).   5
Our cross-sectional analysis provides further support to our interpretations of the Hart-Moore-
Holmström and critical resource theories.  Firms with more alienable assets at the time of the business plan 
have substantially more human capital turnover over time.  Again, this suggests that specific human capital is 
more critical before alienable assets have formed.   
Our results also are consistent with recent theoretical work by Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein 
(2005).   Their model studies the tradeoffs between academic and private sector research.  Based on control 
right considerations, they predict that once an idea becomes the property of a private firm (rather than an 
academic institution), it will be developed along relatively narrow lines. 
From a practitioner perspective, we interpret the greater stability of the lines of business in our 
sample relative to that of management teams as favoring the business / market view of VC investing over the 
best available management team view.  The results suggest that VCs are regularly able to find management 
replacements or improvements for good businesses.  At least in our sample, we do not find cases in which 
VCs invest in good managers who move the firms into different businesses. 
We then consider the division of rents.  Using ownership stakes just before the IPO, we estimate the 
percentage of value that founders retain for their ideas rather than for incentive purposes.  For their human 
capital assets specific to the company, our estimates suggest that founders retain from 10% to 19% of the 
value created by the firm.  Regardless of whether these estimates are interpreted as small or large, they 
appear to be much lower than those for an earlier time period in Baker and Gompers (1999).  This finding 
raises some doubt regarding the claim in Zingales (2000) that more recent, “new” firms are more dependent 
on specific human capital and, therefore, should allot a greater fraction of the value created to founders. 
We view this study and methodology as an early empirical step in studying the nature and evolution 
of firms.  While we believe that the results are novel and useful in interpreting theories of the firm, we 
acknowledge that the sample is indeed a special one in that the firms are all VC-funded and eventually went 
public.  There are two reasons we chose to study this sample.  First, we were able to obtain a relatively large 
data set.  Second, as we discuss in the paper, VC-funded firms represent a substantial fraction of all IPOs (at 
least 39%) and a higher fraction of all start-ups that ultimately go public.    6
At the same time that this is an economically important sample to study, there are two reasons why 
the results may be special to this sample.  First, VCs may choose to fund only those companies in which 
specific human capital is relatively unimportant.  Zingales (2000) argues that VCs will invest in and organize 
firms such that the organization is not too dependent on any specific entrepreneur or individual.  Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003) find that VC contracts are carefully designed to give the VCs sufficient control rights to 
organize firms and replace founders and management when appropriate.  Second, VCs may have special 
skills that can be interpreted as specific human capital.  Hellman and Puri (2000 and 2002) find that VC-
backed firms introduce products and professionalize management more quickly than non-VC-backed firms.  
This type of human capital may substitute for the human capital of a specific founder.   A logical avenue for 
future research is to consider whether our results hold for non-VC backed firms. 
Our work is closely related to three other research efforts.  Bhide (2000) studies 100 companies from 
Inc. Magazine’s list of 500 fastest growing companies in 1989.  Based on interviews with founders, Bhide 
finds that over 70% of those companies are founded by people who replicated or modified an idea 
encountered in their previous employment.  They do relatively little planning before starting the business.  
Partly as a result, these companies frequently adjust their business plans as they operate.  Bhide contrasts 
these companies to VC-funded companies which he argues are more likely to “have innovative ideas and a 
verifiable record of … achievement (p. 111).”  Our study complements his in that we focus on VC funded 
companies.  In addition, we focus more on the nature of the initial attributes of a company, how those 
attributes evolve, and how those attributes affect outcomes. 
Our work also is related to the papers that emerged from the Stanford Project on Emerging 
Companies (Baron and Hannan (2002), Baron et al. 1999, Baron et. al. 2001; Hannan et al. 2000; and 
Hellman and Puri (2000 and 2002)).   Like we do, they study a panel of young firms – high technology firms 
in Silicon Valley – but they ask a different set of questions.  Baron and Hannan (2002) summarize the 
findings of their papers as showing that initial employment models are important and tend to persist.  When 
they are changed, employee turnover increases and performance declines.     7
Finally, Santos and Eisenhardt (2004) provide a case-based study of five new information 
technology firms.  They study how those firms attempted to claim their initial market, how they demarcated 
that market, and how they used acquisitions to consolidate that market.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I describes our sample.  Section II describes the initial 
financial characteristics, business idea, point(s) of differentiation, assets and technology, growth strategy, 
customers, competitors, strategic alliances, management, ownership structure, and board of directors of the 
sample firms and their evolution.  Section III presents our cross-sectional estimates.  Section IV summarizes 
and discusses our results. 
 
I. Sample 
  The sample consists of forty-nine companies that went public in an IPO and for which we obtained 
an early business plan or business description at the time of a VC financing.  We obtained twenty-nine of the 
companies from the sample of VC financed companies in Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).  We obtained an 
additional twenty companies by asking several VCs to provide business plans of companies they had 
financed that had subsequently gone public.   
For all of the companies in the sample, we have copies of the business plans and / or the venture 
capitalist investment memos that describe the company at the time of venture capital funding.  (We do not 
find meaningful differences in the two types of documents.  Accordingly, in what follows, we drop the 
distinction and collectively refer to them as business plans.)  We are able to identify the early (and often 
initial) characteristics of these firms.  For all of the sample companies, we also have detailed descriptions of 
the companies at the time of their IPOs.  We obtain IPO descriptions from S-1 registration statements and 
424B prospectuses filed with the SEC.  When available, we collect the company’s annual report that is 
closest to 36 months after the IPO, a period roughly equal to the time from the business plan to the IPO.  If 
an annual report is not available 36 months after the IPO, we collect the latest annual report that is at least 12 
months after the IPO.  We obtain annual report descriptions from SEC form 10-K filings.     8
For ten companies, we do not record an annual report observation:  three companies were taken over 
and one went bankrupt less than one year after the IPO; five companies are public, but have not filed an 
annual report more than twelve months after the IPO; one company is a Canadian firm which does not file 
annual reports with the SEC.  We retain the business plan and IPO observations for all forty-nine firms.   
 
A. Description 
Table 1 presents summary information for our sample.  The median company is 24 months old as of 
the business plan, so these documents describe the companies when they are young.  As we document below, 
these companies are early stage businesses at the time of the business plan; the median company had no 
revenue in the most recently ended fiscal year at the time of the business plan.  
The median time elapsed between the business plan and the IPO in our sample is 34 months, with a 
further median gap of 33 months between the IPO and the annual report observations.  The IPO observation 
is therefore quite close to the midpoint of the business plan and annual report observations.  The median total 
time elapsed is 63 months; the average is 68 months.  Since the median total time elapsed is more than twice 
the median company age at our first observation, our 3 observations should be sufficiently spaced in time to 
have the opportunity to observe meaningful time series variation in company characteristics.   
Of the 48 companies whose founders we were able to identify, 21 have one founder, 16 have two co-
founders, and 11 were co-founded by three or more individuals.     
The frequency distributions in table 1 show that the bulk of the sample companies were founded in 
the early-to-mid nineties while the business plans describe the companies in the mid-to-late nineties.  Thirty-
one of the forty-nine IPOs took place in 1998, 1999, or 2000, at the height of the technology boom.  The 
industry breakdown of our sample is heavily weighted towards high-technology firms:  17 in biotech, 15 in 
software/information technology, 3 in telecom, 5 in healthcare, 5 in retail, and 4 in other industries, of which 
3 are high-tech companies.  The time frame of the sample, therefore, also corresponds to the period in which 
“new firms” emerged as described in Zingales (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2001b).   9
Finally, table 1 shows our companies’ status as of July 31, 2005.  27 are still active, independent 
companies.  15 have been acquired, and 7 have failed and gone bankrupt. 
 
B.  Sample selection issues 
In this section, we discuss potential selection issues.  Most importantly, our sample includes only 
VC-backed firms because it is from our VC contacts that we were able to obtain the necessary data.  VC-
backed firms represent only a small fraction of all entrepreneurial firms and are unlikely to be representative 
of the typical entrepreneurial firm because of various constraints, conditions, and practices governing venture 
capitalists’ selection of their portfolio companies.  For example, VCs typically invest several million dollars 
in any given company.  For such an investment to make sense, the VC must expect the portfolio company to 
be able to use the capital and offer a return that is a multiple of the VCs’ investment.  Typical mom-and-pop 
stores or other low-risk, low-reward start-up firms are not in a position to do either of these.   
Even though they are not representative of all start-ups, VC-backed start-ups are an important subject 
for study because they tend to include the most promising start-ups that end up having a disproportionate 
impact on the economy.  In particular, VC funded companies typically comprise a substantial fraction of 
young companies that go public in any given year.  According to the National Venture Capital Association 
(2004), about 39% of all IPOs from 1993 to 2003 are VC-financed companies.  This understates the fraction 
of IPOs of young companies that are VC financed because some of the non-VC financed IPOs are mature 
companies such as divisions of public companies (spin-offs or equity carve-outs) or companies returning to 
the public markets after having gone private.  We discuss results that may be special to VC-backed firms as 
we come to them in the paper and in the conclusion. 
Among the VC-financed universe of firms, our sample of portfolio companies and financings is not a 
random sample in that we obtained the data from VC firms with whom we have a relationship.  The 29 
companies from Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) are taken from a sample of 119 VC-backed companies.  As 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) do not find any obvious bias in the 119 companies, we do not think there are 
any obvious biases in the 29 companies that went public.  The additional 20 companies provided by VCs at   10
our request represent those companies that the VCs had financed and subsequently taken public.  The VCs 
who agreed to participate provided all the relevant business plans they could find so there should not be a 
selection bias for any particular VC.   
Finally, it is possible that there is some bias in the VCs who decide to participate.  Such a bias would 
affect our results only if those VCs invest in companies with atypical initial assets that evolve in an atypical 
way.  For example, the VCs in our sample may focus on one of non-human or human capital over the other.  
Although this is possible, we have no reason to believe the participating VCs are atypical in this sense. 
The industries of the sample firms are representative of the industries that VCs invest in.  At the 
same time, however, investments in biotech and healthcare are over-represented –  45% of our sample versus 
roughly 20% of the overall VC market – while investments in software, information technology and telecom 
are under-represented relative to the overall VC market (see National Venture Capital Association (2004)).  
Because biotech firms, in particular, are oversampled and potentially different from other types of 
companies, we report most of our results separately for biotech and non-biotech firms.  
 
II. Results 
A.  Financials and Employees 
Table 2 summarizes the financial and employment histories of our firms.    Consistent with 
describing the firms at an early stage, revenues, assets, and employees of the sample firms are small at the 
time of the business plans.  They increase by orders of magnitude between the business plan and the annual 
report.  Negative profits are the norm at the business plan.  Despite increases in revenues, assets, employees, 
and market capitalization, the median firm does not become profitable through the post-IPO annual report.   
 
  A.1 Revenue 
At the business plan, the median company reports no revenue in the prior fiscal year.  Average 
revenue is $5.5 million, reflecting seven companies with revenues over $10 million.     11
At the IPO, the median and average revenue figures increase dramatically to $7.2 million and $40.5 
million.  Four companies go public with no revenue in the latest fiscal year; another nine have less than $1 
million in revenues.  By the annual report, revenues increase by another order of magnitude, to a median of 
$35.1 million and an average of $179.0 million.  The huge percentage changes are consistent with the 
revenue levels.  Both the biotech and non-biotech firms experience substantial growth, but the biotech firms 
begin from a smaller base. 
The extremely rapid revenue growth exhibited by our sample suggests that they are successful in 
supplying products and services to quickly growing segments of the economy.   We believe that the 
evolution of company characteristics we consider in this paper is particularly interesting in light of this rapid 
growth.  Rapid revenue growth into the millions of dollars per year is characteristic, according to Bhide 
(2000), of the types of start-ups VCs try to select. 
 
A.2   Employees and revenue per employee 
  The median company has 22 employees at the business plan, 124 at the IPO, and 378 at the annual 
report.  Because retail companies tend to be more labor-intensive than others in our sample, panel B provides 
employee statistics excluding the five retail companies.  The median number of employees for non-retail 
companies is 18, 102, and 256 at the business plan, IPO, and annual report.   
Revenue per employee also increases dramatically over time, from a median of 0 at the business plan 
to $50.5 thousand at the IPO and $124.6 thousand at the annual report.  The increase for the non-retail 
subsample is similar to that of the overall sample.    
 
  A.3   Assets 
  Asset growth for the sample parallels revenue growth, suggesting the need for large investment 
outlays to generate such rapid growth.  The median company’s book assets at the business plan, IPO, and 
annual report are, respectively, $2.6 million, $19.6 million, and $96.7 million; the average company’s are 
$5.9 million, $44.3 million, and $274.9 million.       12
 
  A.4  Earning Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
  Our companies are unprofitable at the time of the business plan – when we can measure profitability.  
The losses increase from the business plan through the IPO and annual report.  This is consistent with the 
patterns for recent IPOs described in Fama and French (2003), particularly for young firms.  The median 
company’s EBIT for the fiscal year prior to the business plan, IPO, and annual report are, respectively, -
$0.78 million, -$6.7 million, and -$25.6 million.  Bhide (2000, p. 155) writes that “the financial projections 
of VC-backed firms usually anticipate negative cash flows for several years.”  These projections are borne 
out in our sample -- only 17%, 18%, and 15% of firms, respectively, are profitable at the business plan, IPO, 
and annual report.  The patterns of medians are similar for both biotech and non-biotech firms.  However, 
biotech firms are less likely to be profitable, with 13%, 6%, and 0%, respectively, profitable at the business 
plan, IPO, and annual report. 
 
  A.5   Market capitalization and market-to-assets ratio 
  We calculate market capitalization at the business plan as the value of the company after a VC 
financing that occurs within six months of the date of the business plan.  Market capitalization at the IPO is 
calculated as the first trading day’s closing price times the number of shares outstanding following the 
offering.  Market capitalization at the annual report is the average of the high and low stock prices during the 
last quarter of the year covered by the annual report times the number of shares outstanding as of the issue 
date of the report.  We do not have a market capitalization figure at the annual report for one company whose 
shares were delisted.        
  The median market capitalization increases sharply from $17.9 million at the business plan to $232.4 
million at the IPO, and then declines to $176.9 million at the annual report.  The corresponding median 
market-to-assets ratios are 5.4, 13.9, and 1.8.  The market capitalization figures indicate a roughly tenfold 
increase in value from business plan to IPO, a period of roughly 3 years.  These companies, despite their   13
negative profits, are highly valued.  The decline in the market capitalization after the IPO is consistent with 
(and likely driven by) the technology stock “bust” from 2000 to 2002.   
 
B.  Business 
1.  Line of business 
Panel A of table 3 presents a description of each company’s business as described in each of the 
three relevant documents.  For each company, we determine if the description of the business changes from 
one point in time to the next.  We categorize the changes in two ways.  First, we consider whether firms 
change their line of business.  The line of business changes if the firm sells to a completely different set of 
customers or if the firm markedly changes the products or services it offers.  Second, we consider whether 
firms broaden, narrow, or maintain their initial business model or line of business.  If Apple Computer were 
in the sample, we would classify Apple as having the same line of business it had when it started – personal 
computers sold to the same customers – but with a line of business that had broadened.    
These comparisons admittedly have a subjective component to them.  We report the individual 
descriptions to give the reader a sense of the type and magnitude of these changes.  The descriptions have 
been coarsened to protect the anonymity of the portfolio companies and VC firms.  The descriptions in the 
business plans and other documents are always at least a paragraph and usually much longer.  We base our 
measurements and conclusions on the more detailed descriptions to which we have access. 
At the end of panel A, we report the percentage of companies that fall into each category. One 
notable result emerges quickly in this table.  While we observe broadening or narrowing of the business, only 
one of the forty-nine firms in our sample changes its line of business.   For example, a biotech firm may 
decide to narrow its focus from disease prevention in general to focusing on a specific type of vaccine 
(company 36).  Or an e-commerce firm might broaden its e-commerce offerings to include more services and 
infrastructure offerings (company 31).   We do not observe any of the firms undertaking acquisitions 
unrelated to the original business.  We also do not observe radical shifts in focus such as a medical 
equipment company switching to drug development.  Company 49 undergoes the greatest change, moving   14
from offering a new computing platform to a new operating system to a suite of software programs, each 
time dropping the previous idea, but even in this case there is a general focus on personal computing.   
This result suggests that the initial business lines and / or the accompanying attributes of those 
businesses do not change and, therefore, appear to be core to our sample firms.  The result is consistent with 
the assertion of Bhide (2000, p.155) that “VC-backed firms face less pressure to change their plans than do 
[other] promising start-ups.”   
For the most part, companies tend to broaden or at least not reduce their offerings within markets.  
For the 48 companies that did not change their line of business, panel A of table 3 shows that only 13% 
narrowed their lines of business between the business plan and IPO, 8% narrowed between the IPO and 
annual report, and only 13% had narrower offerings at the annual report than at the business plan.  Over the 
corresponding periods, 42%, 42%, and 37%.of the firms keep their offerings roughly the same, while 46%, 
50%, and 50% broaden their offerings.   
Non-biotech firms differ from biotech firms in that non-biotech firms rarely narrow their line(s) of 
business while biotech firms are more likely to narrow and less likely to broaden their line(s) of business.   
 
2.  Origin of business idea 
Panel B of table 3 classifies the origin of the business idea.  Of the 34 companies for which we were 
able to find a definitive source, 5 were formed as spin-offs or joint ventures of already existing companies, 
15 were started to exploit an idea the founder(s) had as a result of previous jobs, and 14 were based on 
academic research.  Again, there is a clear difference for biotech firms which are more likely to be based on 
academic research while non-biotech firms are most likely to be based on ideas from previous jobs.
3    
 
 
                                                           
3 See Gompers et al. (2005) who study the background of founders in a large sample of venture-backed start-ups.  The 
margin between forming new ventures as start-ups (entrepreneurship) or within established firms (intrapreneurship) has 
been analyzed to some extent (e.g., Gromb and Scharfstein 2002).  Also, see Aghion et al. (2005) who study the role of 
non-profit academic institutions in innovation. 
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3.  Business strategy 
Panel B also classifies our companies’ business plan strategies into the categories of Baron, Hannon, 
and Burton (1999).  Innovators are companies striving to create novel products for new, undeveloped 
markets.  Enhancers are companies striving to improve upon products for already developed markets.  
Marketers are companies whose core competency lies in the marketing, distribution, and sales of their 
products.  Technology/marketing hybrids are companies that share characteristics of the marketers as well as 
innovators/enhancers.  Cost refers to companies who compete primarily by providing their product at low 
cost.  We classify 24 firms (49%) as innovators, 11 (22%) as enhancers, 5 (10%) as marketers, 6 (12%) as 
technology/marketing hybrids, and 3 (6%) as cost.  This distribution is similar to that of Baron et al.’s (1999) 
larger sample of 149 companies:  50%, 19%, 13%, 11%, and 7%, respectively.   
 
C.  Point of differentiation 
In table 4, we classify how the sample firms differentiate themselves from their competitors over the 
sample period.  We rely on the distinguishing characteristics stated by the companies themselves.   
We mention two caveats in interpreting these results.  First, it is possible that the business plans are 
overly positive because the entrepreneurs are marketing their companies to the VCs.  While possible, we do 
not find any appreciable difference between business plans (prepared by the firms) and investment memos 
(prepared by the VCs) with respect to the variables we analyze.  Second, it is possible that the descriptions in 
the public documents – IPO prospectuses and Annual Reports – differ from those in the business plan 
because of legal liability concerns rather than business reasons.   
By far the most important factor, cited by 100%, 98%, and 92% of companies, respectively, at the 
business plan, IPO, and annual report, is a belief that the company offers a unique product and/or technology.   
A small number of firms – 6%, 12%, and 13% – cite the comprehensiveness of their products as 
differentiating at the three relevant dates.     16
Customer service becomes an increasingly important source of differentiation over time, increasing 
from 8% to 16% to 26% as a differentiating factor, respectively at the business plan, IPO, and annual report.   
Not surprisingly, customer service is relatively more important in the non-biotech firms.   
Alliances and partnerships are of modest importance throughout with 12%, 12%, and 8% of the firms 
referring to them at the business plan, IPO and annual report.   
At the business plan, 45% of companies cite the expertise of their management and other employees 
as distinguishing characteristics.  This suggests that specific human capital plays an important role in the 
early life of many of these companies.  The percentage of firms that cite expertise declines to 14% at the IPO 
and 13% at the annual report.  This result is suggestive of an increasingly important role for non-human 
capital compared to specific human capital as companies mature.  There is not much difference in the 
importance of expertise between biotech and non-biotech firms.   
A small number of firms – 4%, 2%, and 5% – also cite scientific advisors, another human capital 
related resource – as important. 
Finally, a small number of firms – 6%, 8%, and 8% – cite reputation as important.  This may reflect 
human or non-human capital reputation. 
The transition percentages shown in table 4 indicate that self-reported company distinguishing 
characteristics are generally stable over time.  The columns labeled “yes to no” and “no to yes” show the 
percentage of firms for which a given characteristic was (was not) cited at one time but was not (was) cited at 
a later time.  The one exception is the large reduction in firms citing management or employee expertise as a 
differentiating characteristic from the business plan to the IPO.   
Overall, self-reported distinguishing characteristics suggest that non-human capital assets are more 
important than specific human capital assets initially, and that the relative importance increases over time.  
 
D.  Assets and Technology 
  In table 5, we describe the types of assets owned by our firms.  We note whether each firm mentions 
patents, physical assets, and / or non-patented intellectual property as important or central to the business.    17
For example, while all firms have some physical assets, those physical assets do not necessarily differentiate 
or add value to the business.  In particular, specific physical assets are generally not critical to software firms.   
We classify the patents and physical assets as alienable assets because they can potentially be sold or 
assigned to other companies.  We classify non-patented intellectual property as some kind of process, 
technique, or knowledge that the company believes is an important asset, but is not patented or assignable.  
Such non-patented intellectual property may or may not be tied to specific human capital.   
A firm can have both patented and non-patented intellectual property.  In the table, when we refer to 
proprietary intellectual property, this includes both patented and non-patented intellectual property.  The 
distinction does not affect the percentages because all firms with patented intellectual property also claim to 
have non-patented intellectual property. 
Table 5 indicates that patents and physical assets become increasingly important from the business 
plan to the IPO to the annual report.  At the business plan, 29% of companies own or are the exclusive 
licensees of patents; at the IPO, 49%; and at the annual report, 62%.  While patents and exclusive licenses 
are most important for biotech firms, they also are important for non-retail, non-biotech firms.   
Physical assets are relatively unimportant for biotech firms and always important for retail firms.  
Physical assets become increasingly important for non-retail, non-biotech firms, going from 9% to 18% to 
29% from business plan through annual report.  When patents and physical assets are combined as alienable 
assets, we find that 43%, 67%, and 82% of the sample firms have such assets, respectively, at the business 
plan, IPO, and annual report. 
Proprietary intellectual property is important for almost all of the non-retail firms – both biotech and 
non-biotech.  Intellectual property, therefore, whether patented or not, is substantially more important than 
physical assets.  This implies that the non-retail companies in the sample are based largely on ideas or 
knowledge rather than physical capital.  This is consistent with arguments in Zingales (2000) that firms are 
increasingly defined by intellectual rather than physical capital. 
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E. Growth  strategy 
In table 6, we document the elements and evolution of the companies’ growth strategies.  At all 
times, the firms are strongly oriented towards internal growth.  The most cited strategies at the business plan, 
IPO and annual report are to produce new or upgraded products (59%, 82% and 72%, respectively), followed 
by obtaining additional customers through increased market penetration or market leadership (49%, 71%, 
and 56%, respectively).   Companies also plan to expand geographically (20%, 43%, and 21%, respectively).  
All three types of internal growth peak at the time of the IPO.  It is worth noting that the emphasis on internal 
growth and, particularly, new products, is consistent with the result in table 5 that these companies rely 
heavily on differentiated products and technologies. 
External growth through alliances and partnerships or through acquisitions becomes relatively more 
important over time.  At the business plan, 29% and 2%, respectively, of the firms look for growth through 
alliances or acquisitions.  By the time of the third annual report, this has increased to 51% and 28%, 
respectively.  At all times, biotech companies are more likely to pursue alliances – typically with large 
pharmaceutical companies for the development, testing, and / or distribution of their products. 
  The transition percentages show that growth strategies tend to broaden between the business plan 
and IPO.  The percentages in the “no to yes” column are all considerably larger than those in the “yes to no” 
column.  By the IPO, companies are trying to grow along more dimensions than at the business plan.   
Surprisingly, growth strategies seem to narrow somewhat between the IPO and annual report.   
Except for acquisitions, the percentages in the “yes to no” column are larger than those in the “no to yes” 
column.  Two explanations are possible.  Perhaps some of the growth strategies cited at the IPO were 
unsuccessful and, therefore, abandoned.  Another explanation is increased conservatism due to the decrease 
in market capitalization and net income. 
 
F. Customers 
In table 7, we describe the evolution of our companies’ customers.  At the business plan, only 47% 
actually have customers; by the IPO, 90% have customers; and by the annual report, 95% have customers.    19
At all stages, biotech firms are less likely to have customers than the non-biotech firms.  All of these 
percentages are consistent with the revenue results presented in table 2.   
Roughly 85% of the sample companies target businesses as customers while 15% target consumers 
as customers.  These percentages are stable through all stages, consistent with the results on the stability of 
the business model in table 3.  
  We characterize the evolution of company customer bases as broadening, narrowing, or staying 
about the same.  An example of a broadening customer base would be a company that targets its products to 
medium-sized businesses at the business plan, but targets its products to both medium-sized and large 
(Fortune 500) companies at the IPO.  The majority of the companies address a similar customer base over 
time, consistent again with the stability of the business models in the sample.  Roughly one-third of the firms 
broaden their customer bases.  About one-quarter broaden from business plan to IPO and another 15% 
broaden from IPO to annual report.  A small fraction of the sample firms narrows their customer base. 
These results suggest that the dramatic revenue increases in table 2 are primarily driven by selling 
more to an initial customer type either through increased market penetration or by selling additional 
products.  The revenue increases are likely driven secondarily by selling to new types of customers. 
  
  G. Competitors 
  Table 8 describes the competition faced by the sample companies.  At the business plan, 84% of the 
companies note that they face competition in their target markets.  Typically this competition includes other 
startups as well as established firms.  Of the other 16% of companies, 10% do not mention competition while 
6% (three companies) claim that their product or market niche is so unusual that they face no real 
competition.  All 49 companies note that they have competition by the IPO.   
  The type of competition named remains fairly stable with 56% of the firms claiming to face similar 
competitive threats over all three stages.  Roughly 40% see a broadening in the types of companies they 
compete with while one company sees a narrowing.  Again, this result seems consistent with the stability of 
the business model found in table 3.   20
 
H.  Strategic alliances and other partnerships 
  The use of strategic alliances provides some evidence regarding firm boundaries because such 
alliances allow firms to contract to cooperate and share resources without merging.  Table 9 summarizes the 
use and evolution of strategic alliances and other similar partnership arrangements by the sample companies.   
  The use of strategic alliances increases from business plan to IPO and then is approximately flat 
from IPO to annual report.  The increase is particularly large for the biotech firms.  At the business plan, 35% 
of the companies mention strategic alliances.  This increases to 67% at the IPO and 69% at the annual report.  
For biotech companies, 18%, 82%, and 82%, respectively, have alliances at the business plan, IPO and 
annual report; for non-biotech companies, the corresponding percentages are 44%, 59%, and 64%.  Among 
companies with strategic alliances, the median (average) number of alliances increases over time from 2 (2.2) 
at the business plan to 3 (3.3) at the IPO to 4 (5.4) at the annual report.   
  Although strategic alliances are not as common before the IPO, those that do exist are more stable 
through the IPO.  Among companies with strategic alliances at the business plan, a median (average) 67% 
(60%) of those alliances still exist at the IPO.  Among companies with strategic alliances at the IPO, only 
42% (46%) survive to the annual report.  Overall, only a median 20% (average 39%) of alliances at the 
business plan still exist at the annual report.    
 
  I. Management 
  The previous tables have focused largely on the non-human capital elements of the sample 
companies.  We now turn our attention to the human capital elements of the firms.  
Panel A of table 10 characterizes the top five executives described in the business plan, IPO 
prospectus, and annual report.  At the time of the business plan, the management teams are incomplete, 
particularly the biotech firms:  six of the companies (12%), five of which are in biotech, do not have a CEO; 
only 42% list a chief financial officer (CFO) as one of the top five executives; and only 38% list a sales or   21
marketing executive (CMO).  Consistent with the importance of technology, 77% of the firms list a Chief 
Scientist, Chief Technical Officer, Vice President of Engineering (CTO), or similar as a top five executive.   
By the time of the IPO and annual report, CFOs have become increasingly important, with 80% and 
85% of the companies listing a CFO as a top five executive.  The importance of sales and marketing remains 
fairly constant over time with 38%, 37%, and 41% of companies having a VP of marketing or similar as a 
top five executive at the business plan, IPO, and annual report.  Biotech companies are much less likely to 
have such a person as a top five manager.  The importance of a chief technology or science officer is stable at 
the IPO (at 77%), but declines substantially (to 47%) by the annual report 
Panel A also provides information on the involvement of founders.   Founders are heavily involved 
with the companies at the time of the business plan.  We can identify a founder as the CEO of 77% of the 43 
companies with a CEO (33 companies).  We also can identify a founder as being on the board in 92% of the 
companies in which the founder is not the CEO and we have board information.  A founder is a top five 
manager or on the board of all 47 companies for which we have board and management data. 
Involvement of founders declines steadily over time.  By the time of the IPO, only 57% of the CEOs 
are founders while 92% of the firms still have a founder as a top executive or a director.   By the time of the 
annual report, 46% of the CEOs are founders while only 72% of the firms still have a founder as a top 
executive or a director.  This suggests that over time, founders move from operating positions to board 
positions to no involvement with the company.   
Panel B describes the previous backgrounds of the top five executives listed in the business plan.  
We characterize 42% of these executives with a background in general management, 25% in technical or 
technology management, 16% in science or other technical jobs, 9% with marketing backgrounds, and 8% 
with backgrounds in finance or accounting. The biotech company executives are more likely to have a 
technical management or science background while the non-biotech company executives are more likely to 
have a general management background.  Nevertheless, for both types of firms, it seems, then, that a fairly 
broad set of skills are employed to manage our sample companies, even when they are very young.  These 
companies employ the skills of experienced professionals fairly early on.     22
In panel C, we address the stability of human capital in more detail.   CEO turnover is relatively low 
from the business plan to the IPO with 84% of the CEOs remaining in place.  Turnover of the other top 
executives is greater with only 55% remaining in place from business plan to IPO.  Turnover of both the 
CEO and the other top five executives is more common after the company has gone public.  Only 59% of the 
CEOs retain their jobs between the IPO and the annual report while only 36% of the other top five executives 
remain the same.  Overall, therefore, turnover is substantial.  From the business plan to the annual report, 
exactly 50% of the CEOs and only 25% of the other top five executives remain the same.      
The third row of panel C reports whether the former CEOs remain with the company in some 
capacity.  At the IPO and annual report, respectively, only 29% and 11% of the former CEOs remain with the 
firms, suggesting, for the most part, that former CEOs leave the sample companies.  The fourth row of panel 
C, presents a similar calculation for the former next four executives.  To an even greater extent, those former 
executives leave the sample companies. 
The relatively high incidence of founder and early executive departures is interesting.  It may 
indicate that those founders and executives are particularly good at starting companies / providing early 
critical resources.  Once the non-human capital is sufficiently established, these founders go on to do the 
same thing at other companies.  We ascertain the extent to which this is true in by considering what the 
departing founders and executives do after leaving the firm.   
We search for evidence of subsequent job or founder history in another young company for the 
departing executives in the CapitalIQ, VentureEconomics, and VentureOne databases.  If they do not appear 
in these databases, it is unlikely that they went to another VC-backed or high profile young company.  The 
results are in panel D of table 10.  The first part of panel D shows that we can identify subsequent jobs or 
activities for roughly half of the departing founders and non-founders.  The second part of panel D indicates 
that relatively few of these individuals subsequently found new companies.  The highest percentage is 17%, 
representing one founder who departed between the business plan and the IPO, and subsequently founded 
another company.   The third part of panel D reports the percentage of departing founders and non-founder   23
top executives who become top executives of other young companies.   A larger fraction, roughly one-third, 
of founder and non-founders go on to do so.   
These results in panel D, therefore, indicate that relatively few of the departing founders and 
executives found new companies while a greater (but minority) percentage repeat their experience in 
working for young companies and, potentially providing early critical resources.  We report these findings 
with the caveat that they may understate the true percentages because not enough time has elapsed for some 
of the individuals to emerge in other companies. 
 
  J. Ownership 
  In the previous we described the evolution of human capital.  In this section, we consider the rewards 
and incentives of the providers of that human capital.  Table 11 summarizes company ownership.  Ownership 
data at the business plan reflects 33 firms as we do not have ownership data at that time for 16 firms. 
Panel A shows the evolution of ownership by the founders (taken as a group) and the CEO at the 
different company stages.  We report ownership at the business plan immediately after the VC financing for 
which we have data.  We report ownership both immediately before and immediately after the IPO.   
Founder ownership declines sharply from a median of 28.9% at the business plan to 12.4% just 
before the IPO to 8.8% immediately following the IPO.  Because founders typically are not allowed to sell 
any shares until six months after the IPO, this suggests that founders give up a substantial fraction of their 
ownership stakes in order to attract VC financing and / or outside management talent.  Founder ownership 
continues to decline over the company’s public life, to a median 5.3% at the annual report.  This decline 
reflects founder stock sales as well as issuance of additional stock. 
CEO ownership also declines as the firm ages:  the median CEO owns 15.9% of the company at the 
business plan, 6.7% pre-IPO, 5.4% post-IPO, and 3.6% at the annual report.  CEO ownership declines by a 
median 38% from the business plan to the pre-IPO.   
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The six CEOs who are not founders own a median of 5.5% of the company at the time of the 
business plan.  The twenty-one non-founder CEOs at the time of the IPO own a median of 4.2% of the 
company just before the IPO.   One can interpret these results as indicating that VC-financed companies 
allocate roughly 5% of the company’s equity to attract and provide incentives to an outside CEO.  
Panel A also breaks out the companies by biotech and non-biotech firms.  Biotech and non-biotech 
founders own roughly the same percentage of the companies at the business plan.  At the time of the IPO, 
however, biotech founders own less of the firms than non-biotech founders.  Biotech CEOs own less of the 
firms than non-biotech CEOs both at the business plan and at the IPO.  These results suggest that specific 
human capital is less important in biotech companies.  There are at least two possible explanations.  First, it 
may be easier to patent or assign the intellectual property of these companies.  Second, these companies may 
require more financial capital. 
The CEOs in our sample own an average of 9.8% of the pre-IPO (7.5% of the post-IPO) equity of the 
sample firms.  This is less than the 19.1% pre-IPO (14.0% post-IPO) reported in Baker and Gompers (1999) 
for 433 VC-backed firms that went public between 1978 and 1987.   Part of the reason for the difference is 
that our sample includes relatively more biotech firms which have relatively fewer founder CEOs.  However, 
even for non-biotech firms, the CEO only owns 10.6% pre-IPO (8.2% post-IPO).  Surprisingly, this suggests 
that human capital may have become less important rather than more important over time. 
Panel B of table 11 reports how the ownership of the firm is divided immediately before the IPO.  
VCs, in exchange for financial capital and, potentially, their own human capital, own a median of 52.6% of 
the median company at the IPO.  Founders retain a median 12.4%.  When non-founders, CEOs own a median 
4.2%; non-founder managers other than the CEO collectively own a median 2.2%.  Business partners, such 
as original parent companies and strategic alliance partners, own none of the median firm and 3.8% of the 
average firm.  Others, which include non-VC investors and non-founder employees, collectively, own a 
median of 22.7%.  Panel B also indicates that the founders and management team have smaller equity 
positions in biotech firms than in non-biotech firms.   25
The last column of panel B calculates the dollar value of the founders’ equity stakes using the first 
trading day’s closing price, finding a median value of $17.5 million and an average of $103.3 million.  The 
dollar value of non-biotech founders’ holdings is substantially higher than those of biotech founders. 
Using the ownership stakes just before the IPO in panel B, we can obtain three estimates of the 
percentage of value that founders retain that is not related to ongoing incentives.  The first is the founders’ 
average ownership percentage of 14.6% (median 12.4%).  This is an upper bound, because some of this 
ownership is present for incentive purposes and would be given to non-founding managers.  It is also an 
upper bound because the founders may have contributed non-human capital.   
The second estimate begins with the ownership of founders and the top five managers that equals an 
average of 20.3% (median 16.3%).   In the six cases in which there are no founders among the top five 
managers, their average ownership is 6.0% (median of 6.2%).  The 6.0% stake provides an estimate of how 
much equity is required to attract a new management team to replace the existing one.  The 14.3% difference 
provides another upper bound estimate of the value of the specific human capital that the founders provided.   
A third measure calculates the equity needed for ongoing incentives by adding the average 
ownership of non-founder CEOs, 5.0%, to that of other non-founder, non-CEO top managers, 3.5%, to get a 
total of 8.5%.  Subtracting this 8.5% from the ownership of founders and top five managers of 20.3% yields 
an estimate of 11.8% as the value of the specific human capital provided by the founders.  
In an unreported regression, we regress pre-IPO founder ownership on a constant and a dummy 
variable equal to one if the founder is the CEO at the IPO.  The coefficient on the dummy variable provides 
an estimate of the ownership needed for incentive purposes for the CEO.  The coefficient is likely to be 
biased upward, however, because if the founder is still CEO, the CEO’s value may be unusually high and the 
ownership may include some compensation for specific human capital.  The constant term, therefore, can be 
considered a lower bound on compensation for the idea or specific human capital.  In this regression, the 
constant term is 10.8%. 
Overall, the estimates in panel B suggest that founders retain 10.8% to 14.6% of the value of the pre-
IPO equity for their human capital assets specific to the company.     26
In estimating the value accruing to specific human capital, we have used the total market value of the 
firm’s equity.  This overstates the value created by the firm because it ignores the financial capital invested in 
the company, particularly by the VCs.  Panel C of table 11 presents an analysis similar to that in panel B for 
pre-IPO ownership, except that it measures the founders’ share of total value created before the IPO.  We 
measure the total value created before the IPO as the value of the pre-IPO shares outstanding at the post-IPO 
stock price less the amount of outside financing raised by the firm before the IPO.  The analysis assumes that 
the founders did not invest any money to obtain their shares and do not need to invest any money to exercise 
any options they may have.  As a result, the analysis in panel C overstates the fraction of value accruing to 
founders (while panel B understates the fraction).  One firm did not create any value – pre-IPO outside 
capital exceeded the value of the pre-IPO shares at the IPO price.  We exclude this firm from the analysis. 
Panel C indicates that the founders receive an average of 19.1% (median of 14.4%) of the value 
created.  Again, this is an upper bound because some of this ownership is present for incentive purposes.  
The other two methods of calculating the value founders retain for non-incentive purposes generate estimates 
of 17% and 15.5%. 
The estimates and calculations in panels B and C indicate a range of 10.8% to 19.1% as the value 
that founders retain of the firm for their idea or initial contributions that is not related to ongoing incentives. 
 
K.  Boards of directors 
Table 12 documents the size, composition, and turnover of the boards of directors of our companies.  
The median board size is 5 seats at the business plan, 7 seats at the IPO, and 7 at the annual report.  Insiders, 
defined as founders and current or past company managers, hold a constant median of 2 seats at each of the 
business plan, IPO, and annual report.   VCs hold a median of 2 seats at the business plan, 3 at the IPO, and 1 
at the annual report.  This pattern reflects additional VC investment between the business plan and IPO, and 
profit-taking once the company has issued shares to the public.  Meanwhile, the board presence of non-VC 
outsiders, who are generally either industry experts and / or experienced executives of other firms, increases 
from a median of 1 seat at the business plan to 2 at the IPO to 3 at the annual report.    27
Director turnover also increases after the company goes public.  While 71% of directors at the 
business plan are still directors at the IPO, only 57% of the directors at the IPO are directors at the annual 
report.  Only 40% of the directors at the business plan remain at the annual report.    
 
III. Cross-sectional  Analysis 
  In this section, we present the results of two cross-sectional analyses.   
First, we consider the relation of human capital turnover to the nature of a firm’s assets.  One can 
(loosely) interpret the theories of the firm considered above as predicting that founders and specific human 
capital will be less important or critical when a firm has built up its non-human capital.  In table 13, we try to 
test this by estimating the likelihood of a founder remaining CEO after the business plan.  In panel A, the 
dependent variable equals one if one of the founders is CEO at the IPO; in panel B, the dependent variable 
equals one if one of the founders is CEO at the annual report.  (We obtain qualitatively similar results if we 
use CEO turnover, regardless of whether the CEO was the founder.)  As independent variables, we use the 
results in table 5 and create three dummy variables that equal one if, respectively, alienable assets, physical 
assets, or patents, are cited as significant assets at the business plan.  We also create a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm has no patents and non-patentable intellectual property (IP) is significant. 
The regressions show a clear pattern.  Firms with more alienable assets at the time of the business 
plan have substantially more founder turnover over time.  All of the relevant coefficients are negative;  the 
majority, statistically significant.  Again, this suggests that specific human capital is more critical before 
alienable assets have formed, consistent with both the critical resource and the Hart-Moore-Holmström 
theories.  The strong cross-sectional relation also corroborates our interpretation of the descriptive data.   
The presence of non-patentable IP at the business plan is also negatively related to the likelihood that 
the founder will be remain as CEO later on.  One interpretation of this result is that even unpatented know-
how may be part of alienable organizational capital rather than tied to a specific founder.    28
The regressions also include a number of controls whose signs are more difficult to interpret.  The 
age of the firm at the business plan is positively related to the likelihood of retaining the founder as CEO, 
while expansion of the firm’s business line is negatively related.  The last regression also includes the 
founder ownership stake at the business plan, which is strongly positively related to retaining the founder as 
CEO.  Although this is an endogenous variable, it can be thought of as a proxy for the bargaining power of 
the founder, which in turn should be correlated with the value of the founder’s specific human capital.
5   
Our second cross-sectional analysis considers the determinants of pre-IPO founder ownership.  The 
theories of the firm imply that founders’ bargaining power should decrease in the alienability of a firm’s 
assets.  To the extent that founder ownership is a measure of bargaining power and rents, founder ownership 
should decrease in alienability (tangibility and patents).  We present this analysis in table 14.  The dependent 
variable is pre-IPO founder ownership.  The independent variables are the asset dummies used in table 13, 
and the age of the firm at the business plan.  Unlike the results in table 13, none of the asset dummy variables 
is significant in the regressions.  While it may reflect a paucity of observations or that there are many other 
determinants of founder ownership, the results in table 14 do not provide support for the hold-up theories.  
The lack of a result for hold-up also suggests that the measurement issues stressed in Holmstrom (1999) may 
be more important than hold-up in these companies. 
 
IV.  Summary and Discussion 
In this paper, we have studied the evolution of firm characteristics from early business plan to initial 
public offering to public company for 49 VC financed companies.  This exercise had two goals:  to provide a 
systematic description of the early life and evolution of an important sample of firms; and to interpret our 
findings in relation to existing theories of the firm and what new theories might try to explain. 
The typical company in our sample experiences dramatic growth.  While the companies grow 
dramatically, their core businesses remain remarkably stable.  Within core businesses, firm activities tend to 
                                                           
5 Alternatively, it could be a proxy for the control rights that the founder retains in the venture.  However, in regressions 
using a more direct measure of control, the fraction of founder board seats, the variable is not significant.   29
stay the same or broaden over time.  The firms also sell to similar customers and compete against similar 
competitors in the three stages of the life cycle we examine.   
Almost uniformly, firms claim that they are differentiated by a unique product, technology or service 
at all three stages.  The points of differentiation also tend to be stable over time.  Firms stress the importance 
of proprietary intellectual property (IP), patents, and physical assets in all three stages.  Alienable assets – 
patents and physical assets – become increasingly important over time.  At the business plan, roughly half of 
the firms also stress the importance of expertise (which one might interpret as human capital).  The stated 
importance of expertise, however, declines to less than 15% by the IPO and third annual reports.   
While points of differentiation, alienable assets, customers, and competitors remain relatively 
constant, the human capital of the sample firms changes substantially.  At the time of the annual report, one-
half of the CEOs at the business plan remain; only one-quarter of the next four top executives remain.   
We believe that these results provide support for and help interpret prominent theories of the firm. 
Consistent with the Hart-Moore-Holmström view that a firm must be organized around non-human capital 
assets, non-human capital assets form very early in a firm’s life.  Identifiable lines of business and important 
physical, patent, and IP assets are created in these firms by the time of the early business plan, are relatively 
stable, and do not change or disappear as specific human capital assets turn over.  These arguably constitute 
the “glue” that holds firms together. 
These findings also have implications for the critical resource theories.  The early emergence and 
stability of non-human assets are consistent with those assets being critical resources.  The instability of the 
human assets suggests that to the extent that the initial critical resource is a specific person or founder, the 
“web of specific investments built around the founder(s)” itself becomes the critical resource relatively early 
in a firm’s life.   
Our cross-sectional analysis provides further support to our interpretations of the Hart-Moore-
Holmström and critical resource theories.  Firms with more alienable assets at the time of the business plan 
have substantially more human capital turnover over time.  Again, this suggests that specific human capital is 
more critical before alienable assets have formed.     30
Our analysis also sheds light on the argument in Zingales (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2001a) 
that today’s “new firms” differ from the old, traditional firms of the (early) 20
th century in that alienable 
assets – assets that can be assigned or pledged to other firms – have become less important relative to human 
capital and non-alienable assets (for example, business processes or knowledge).  This argument implies that 
human capital should retain a larger fraction of the value of these “new firms.”  The ownership results in our 
sample do not support this implication.  Founders retain a smaller fraction of their firms at the IPO than the 
founders in IPOs of the 1980s studied in Baker and Gompers (1999).   
From a practitioner perspective, we believe that the greater stability of lines of business and non-
human assets in our sample relative to the stability of management teams favors the business / market / horse 
view of VC investing over the best available management team / jockey view except, perhaps, at the birth of 
a company.  The results suggest that VCs are regularly able to find management replacements or 
improvements for good businesses.  At least in our sample, we do not find cases in which VCs invest in good 
managers who find business replacements.  An initial strong management team, therefore, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient.  An initial strong business may not be sufficient, but appears necessary. 
Some practitioners have suggested that business plans do not matter much – if a VC puts in a great 
management team in a mediocre business, the team will figure out what to do.  Our results suggest that the 
business plan – whether or not it is written down – is very important. 
Finally, we end with an important caveat.  We have studied a special sample of firms – those VCs 
choose to fund.  It is possible, if not likely that VCs fund companies in which specific human capital 
becomes less important relatively quickly.  It also is possible that VCs do not allow managers to change the 
business.  Nevertheless, our results apply to a large fraction of firms that go public – at least 39%.  A logical 
avenue for future research is to consider whether these results hold for non-VC backed firms.  Whether or not 
the results generalize, however, we view the results in this paper as an early empirical look at important 
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 Table 1 – Sample Summary  
Median, average, and standard deviation of (i) the age of the firm in months as of the date of the business plan (BP), 
(ii) the time elapsed in months between the business plan and the IPO, (iii) the time elapsed in months between the 
IPO and the annual report (AR), and (iv) the time elapsed in months between business plan and the annual report for 
49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.  The table also reports frequency distributions of the 
number of founders, the dates sample firms were founded, the dates of their business plans, IPOs, and annual 
reports, the industries in which they operate, and their status as of August 2004. 
              
        Months between  Months between           Months between       
    Age (months) at  Business Plan  IPO and        Business Plan 
Business Plan       and IPO   Annual Report           and Annual Report 
 
Median    24   34   33    63 
Average    40   38   32    68   
St.  dev.    51   23   8    23 
Num.  Obs.   49   49   39    39 
 
Number of companies with Business Plan dated prior to or concurrent with first VC financing: 19 
 
Number of companies with one founder:      21 
Number of companies with two co-founders:     16  
Number of companies with three or more co-founders:  11 
 
Number firms                                                     
founded   N u m b e r   B P s  Number  IPOs Number  ARs 
1975-1980   3         
1980-1984   2         
1985-1989   5    4   1 
1990    1    1      
1991    4        1 
1992    3      2 
1993    2    3      
1994    7    1     1    
1995    9    8   3   1 
1996    5    11   3 
1997    2    9   3   2 
1998    6    9   5   3 
1999       2   14   1   
2000         12   9 
2001       1     5    
2002         1   9 
2003         1   6 
2 0 0 4            4    1  
 
Industry breakdown: 
Biotechnology Software/IT Telecom   Healthcare Retail   Other  
#firms  17   15   3   5   5  4 
 
  
Status as of 7/31/2005: 
  Active    Acquired / Merged Bankrupt 
#firms       27         15            7Table 2  
Financials and Employees 
 
Median, average, and standard deviation of revenue, assets, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), net income, market capitalization, EBIT to revenue ratio, 
market capitalization to book assets ratio,  number of employees, and revenue per employee at the business plan (BP), IPO, and annual report (AR) for 49 VC 
financed companies that subsequently went public.  Revenue, net income, and assets are reported as of the end of the prior fiscal year.  Panel A reports statistics 




 All  firms       Biotechnology  firms     Non-biotechnology  firms 
Revenue ($M)  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR 
Median  0   7.2    35.1   0   2.9   20.7      0.6   12.7  97.5   
Average  5.54   40.5   179.0    0.7   4.9   30.1      8.3   59.5  241.4 
St.  dev.  13.6   154.5    332.7    1.6   5.3   14.8      16.5   189.4  376.0 
Num.  Obs.  47   49    39    17   17   11    30   32  28   
  
Revenue percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  390   408    2,591    140   419   209     607   397  2,094 
Average  2,954   3,569,242    63,255    131   18,249 821      3,378   5,131,678  74,273   
St. dev.  7,593   21,400,000  234,524    224    56,443  1,229     8,081   25,700,000  253,878 
Num.  Obs. 23   36    20    3   11   3      20   25  17 
 
Number of employees  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR    
Median  22   124        378    10   71   134     31   209  561   
Average  92   340    1,267    17   87   195      138   475  1,688 
St.  dev.  202   659    2,320    13   67   141      246   785  2,630 
Num.  Obs.  42   49    39    16   17   11    26   32  28   
  
Number of employees percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  515   100    1,519    528   62   1,170      500   125  2,023 
Average  720   277    3,848    579   128   1,803      806   336  4,700  
St.  dev.  808   492    7,617    544   183   1,970      935   562  8,896 
Num.  Obs.  42   39    34    16   11   10    26   28  24 
 
  
Table 2 (continued) 
 All  firms       Biotechnology  firms     Non-biotechnology  firms 
Revenue per employee ($thousand)  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR 
Median  0   50.5   124.6    0   48.9   87.7      9.9   53.5  136.3   
Average  29.5   63.3   139.4    5.8    45.9   97.7     44.0   72.5  155.8 
St.  dev.  58.5   64.5   98.7    16.4   40.0   66.9     69.8   73.3  105.2 
Num.  Obs.  42   49    39    16   17   11    26   32  28   
  
Revenue per employee percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  51   116    374    -17   111   163      63   120  453 
Average  269   217,486    1497   -17   6,685   163      304   310,239  1,687   
St.  dev.  518   1,290,494    3815    113   20,714  237     539   1,548,924 4,059 
Num.  Obs. 18   36    16    2   11   2      16   25  14 
 
Assets ($M)  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR 
Median  2.6   19.6   96.7   1.8   18.5   91.7      2.9   20.8  108.9   
Average  5.9   44.3   274.9    3.3   23.7   96.7      6.7   55.4  345.0 
St.  dev.  10.8   69.6   663.0    3.9    18.3   64.5     12.3   83.5  773.9 
Num.  Obs.  35   49    39    9    17   11    26   32  28   
  
Assets percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  430   287    2,498    689   361   1,077      396   274  3,253 
Average  2,570   913    52,605    1,231   646    3,505     3,057   1,018  65,526   
St. dev.  6,137   1,812    158,013    1,557   994    5,877     7,090   2,053  176,211 
Num.  Obs. 30   39    24    8   11   5      22   28  19 
 
EBIT ($M)  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR  
Median  -0.8   -6.7    -25.6    -1.4   -10.3   -32.8      -0.8   -5.4  -22.4   
Average  -1.6   -7.7    -48.6    -1.9   -11.7   -30.4      -1.5   -5.6  -55.8 
St.  dev.  2.5   13.5    93.3    2.0   7.5   18.1      2.6   15.5  109.2 
Num.  Obs.  36   49    39    8    17   11    26   32  28   
 
%  positive  17%   18%   15%   13%   6%   0%      18%   25%  21% 
  
Table 2 (continued) 
EBIT percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  159   156    996    538   239   755     120   154  1,046 
Average  1,149   -2,129    9,818    969   182   2,938      1,199   -3,037 11,694 
St. dev.  2,978   15,320    43,675    1,554   212    6,157     3,292   18,091  49,258 
Num.  Obs. 32   39    28    7   11   6      25   28  22 
 
Market capitalization ($M)  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR 
Median  17.9   232.4    176.9    14.1   254.9   265.8      18.7   218.8  163.5   
Average  29.0   697.7    470.8    16.2   388.3   257.6      33.3   862.0  557.7 
St.  dev.  32.9   1920.3    1378.6    11.9   368.2   216.2      36.5   2357.8 1630.9 
Num.  Obs.  40   49    38    10   17   11    30   32  27   
  
Market capitalization percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  1,586   -55    496    2,064   -53    2,370     1,409   -57  417 
Average  7,778   98    10,492    7,101   14    2,830     8,005   132  13,250   
St.  dev.  108865  362    37,055   16,631  139    3,146     19,813  418  43,066 
Num.  Obs.  40   38    34    10   11   9     30   27  25   
       
Market capitalization to assets ratio  
 BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR 
Median  5.4   13.9    1.8    2.3   13.6    2.2     7.1   15.6  1.6   
Average  8.9   23.6    2.3    5.1   22.1    2.8     9.9   24.5  2.0 
St.  dev.  10.1   25.2   2.1    5.6   21.1   2.5      10.8   27.4  1.9 
Num.  Obs.  25   49    38    5    17   11    20   32  27   
  
Market capitalization to assets ratio  percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  80   -89    -61    110   -91   -38      62   -89  -74 
Average  328   -65    -23    694   -79   120     237   -60  -57   
St.  dev.  588   73    162    1015   25   354      420   85  52 
Num.  Obs. 25   38    21    5   11   4      20   27  17 
 Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B – Excluding retail firms 
Percentage Change 
  B P  IPO AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
 
Number of employees 
Median   18  102  256   523   96   1,519 
Average    56  179 582   726   258   3,958 
St.  dev.    115 216 991   821   493   8,056 
Num.  Obs.  38 44 34   38   34   30 
 
Revenue per employee ($thousand) 
Median   0  43.6  121.7   51   164   409 
Average   23.2  55.3  135.0   309   252,558   1,908 
St.  dev.    54.3 53.8 96.5   580    1,390,606  4,369 
Num.  Obs.  38 44 34   14   31   12 
Table 3  
Lines of Business 
 
Stated business at the business plan, IPO, and annual report, as well as the percentage of companies whose stated lines of business broaden, narrow, or stay the 
same over those periods for 49 VC financed companies that subsequently went public.  Panel B categorizes the origin of each company’s business idea, 
according to the business plan, as an existing business, academic research, a previous employer of the founder(s), or unknown.  Panel B also categorizes business 
strategies as of the business plan according to the Baron, Hannan, and Burton (1999) classification system. 
 
Panel A 
Companies whose line of business stays about the same over time 
Company Business  Plan     I P O       Annual  Report 
1   ●Development of analgesics      ●Development of analgesics      ●Development of analgesics 
2   ●Chemical analysis instrumentation     ● Contract research and development     ●Contract research and development  
   and research services         services             services 
3   ●Specialty supermarkets      ● Specialty supermarkets      ● Specialty supermarkets 
4   ●Customer information      ●Enterprise relationship      ●Enterprise customer relationship 
      management software         management software         management software 
5   ●Category-dominant specialty retailer     ●Specialty  retailer     ● Specialty retailer 
6   ●Sustained-release drug delivery systems  ●Sustained-release drug delivery systems  ●Sustained-release drug delivery systems 
7   ●Non-invasive cardiac surgery    ●Non-invasive cardiac surgery    ●Non-invasive cardiac surgery 
8   ●Production of nanocrystalline materials  ●Development and marketing of    ●Engineering and manufacturing of  
             n a n o c r y s t a l l i n e   m a t e r i als         nanocrystalline materials 
9   ●Telecom service provider      ●Telecom service provider      ●Telecom service provider  
10   ● Superstore specialty retailer    ● Full-line specialty  retailer      ● Full-line specialty  retailer     
11   ●Office supply stores      ●Office supply stores      ● Office supply stores 
12   ●Digital prepress equipment      ●Digital prepress equipment 
13   ●Maps and mapping-related      ●Mapping products and services 
       products, services, and technology   
14   ● Therapeutic products for cancer and     ● Therapeutic products for cancer and  
       infectious diseases         infectious diseases   






 Table 3 (cont.) 
 
Companies whose line of business broadens/narrows (B/N) between the business plan and IPO but not between the IPO and the annual report 
Company Business  Plan     I P O        A n n u a l   R e p o r t  
16   ●Wireless data communications    (N) Wireless communication and       ●Wireless health information 
             information  systems  for  health  information         communication  systems     
17   ●Web-based enterprise application software   (N) Live business collaboration software and services  ●Application software and services for real- 
   time enterprise collaboration 
18   ●Experimentation platform for a wide range  (N) Tools for large-scale analysis of genetic variation  ●Tools for large-scale analysis of genetic 
  of biological analyses     and function            variation  and  function 
19   ●Combinatorial chemistry       (N) Computational drug discovery     
20   ●Software and services to industries    (N) Software products and services to accelerate drug  
      transformed by human genome research     discovery and development 
21   ●Implantable hearing devices      (B) Implantable and semi-implantable hearing devices  ●Implantable and semi-implantable hearing 
                   d e v i c e s  
22   ●Drug screening and discovery     (B) Drug candidate development      ●Drug candidate development 
23   ●Drug target discovery         (B) Drug target discovery and small      ●Small molecule drug discovery and  
             molecule  drug  development            development 
24   ●Products for the treatment of abnormal  (B) Surgical systems for the diagnosis and    ●Surgical systems for the diagnosis and  
       uterine bleeding           treatment of gynecological disorders         treatment of gynecological disorders 
25   ●Products and services to accelerate drug  (B) Creating drug candidates through innovations   ● Creating small molecule drugs through the  
   discovery        in chemistry               integration of chemistry, biology and  
                i n f o r m a t i c s  
26   ●Internet-based micropayments system   (B) Internet-based direct marketing and advertising 
   and incentive currency           services combined with programs that reward  
   consumers with cash   
27   ●Treatment for psychotic major depression   (B) Drug development for severe psychiatric and  
             neurological  diseases   
28   ●Discovery and development of drugs for  (B) Development of drugs for a broad range of central 
       memory-related disorders             nervous system disorders 
29   ●Development of treatments for pulmonary  (B) Discovery and development of treatments for allergies, 





 Table 3 (cont.) 
 
Companies whose line of business broadens/narrows (B/N) between IPO and annual report but not between business plan and IPO 
Company Business  Plan     I P O        A n n u a l   R e p o r t  
30   ●Diagnostic imaging and treatment of cancer  ●Diagostic imaging and treatment of cancer,     (N) New drugs to treat cancer and  
      and cardiovascular disease         artherosclerosis, and other diseases             artheroscelerosis 
31   ●Internet data delivery software    ●Internet data delivery software        (B) E-business infrastructure software and 
                   s e r v i c e s  
32   ●Sales and marketing automation software  ●Sales, marketing, and customer support     (B) Customer relationship management 
   automation software            software 
33   ●Microfluidics     ●Microfluidics        (B)  Novel  assay  chemistry  solutions  for  drug 
                   d i s c o v e r y   a n d   d e v e l o p m e n t  
34   ●Upscale, casual ethnic      ●Upscale,  casual  ethnic     (B)  Upscale,  casual  ethnic 
       restaurants          restaurants                 restaurants and casual ethnic diners 
 
Companies whose line of business broadens/narrows (B/N) between both the business plan and IPO and the IPO and annual report 
Company Business  Plan     I P O        A n n u a l   R e p o r t  
35   ●E-commerce  solutions      (N)  E-commerce  and direct marketing services     (B) Technology infrastructure and services 
36   ●Disease prevention       (N) Live-virus vaccines        (B) Disease prevention through vaccine 
      technology 
37   ●Novel antimicrobial compounds     (B) New antibacterial and antifungal drugs     (N) Prevention of ventilator-associated 
       pneumonia 
38   ●Internet marketing software     (B) Internet marketing and data aggregation software  (B) E-business products and services 
39   ●Internet communication services     (B) Internet system and network management     (B) Internet infrastructure outsourcing 
40   ●Website production software     (B) Web content management software       (B) Enterprise content management software 
41   ●Hotel reservation and       (B) Transaction processing services for the     (B) Hotel reservation and representation 
       commission collection system         worldwide hotel industry               services for the global hotel industry 
42   ●Market research         (B) Market research and  polling      (B)  Market  research and consulting 
43   ●Semiconductor laser diodes and related  (B) Semiconductor optoelectronic integrated     (B) Semiconductor circuits and lasers; fiber- 
       systems and subsystems              circuits and high power semiconductor lasers             optic systems    
44   ●Local switched telecommunications    (B) Competitive local exchange carrier     (B) National communications provider 
       services  
45   ●Basic local telephone services     (B) Facilities-based competitive local       (B) Facilities-based operator of a  
             e x c h a n g e   c a r r i e r               fiber optic communications infrastructure 
46   ●Customer interaction software     (B) E-business infrastructure software      (B) Enterprise software vendor 
47   ●Sterilization systems for medical     (B) Sterile processing and infection prevention    (B) Infection prevention, contamination 
   instruments            systems                 control, microbial reduction, and critical  
                 care  support  products  and  services 
48   ●Disease gene discovery       (B) Gene and drug target discovery, database, and  (B) Population genetics company developing  
               information  technology    products and services       drugs and DNA-based diagnostics 
 
  Companies whose line of business changes (C) between both the business plan and IPO and the IPO and annual report 
Company Business  Plan     I P O        A n n u a l   R e p o r t  
49   ●New computing platform      (C) Computer operating system      (C) Software solutions for Internet appliances Table 3 (cont.) 
 
All Firms             BP to IPO IPO  to  AR BP/IM  to  AR 
Percent whose business model changes    2         3      3 
 
Number  observations     49              39    39   
 
All Firms 
Percent whose line of business          BP to IPO IPO  to  AR BP/IM  to  AR 
Stays about the same        42        42      37 
Broadens     46              50    50 
N a r r o w s        1 3                 8     1 3  
 
Number  observations     48              38    38   
 
Biotechnology Firms 
Percent whose line of business          BP to IPO IPO  to  AR BP/IM  to  AR 
Stays about the same        29        55      18 
Broadens     47              27    45 
N a r r o w s        2 4               1 8     3 6  
 
Number  observations     17              11    11 
 
Non-biotechnology Firms 
Percent whose line of business          BP to IPO IPO  to  AR BP/IM  to  AR 
Stays about the same        49        37      45 
Broadens     45              59    52 
Narrows             6         4       3 
 




Origin of Business Idea: 
   
Existing   Previous   Academic  Out of the blue  
business  employer research   or  unknown    
 
All  firms 5   15   14   15      
Biotech   1   2   10   4 
Non-Biotech  4   13   4   11 
    
 
Baron et al. (1999) classification of business plan strategy: 
 
  Innovator Enhancer Marketing Tech/marketing  hybrid Cost  
 
All  firms 24   11   5   6    3 
Biotech   12   4   0   1    0   
Non-Biotech  12   7   5   5    3 
 Table 4 
Point of differentiation 
 
Percent of companies that explicitly mention the following characteristics as those that distinguish the company:  unique product, service, or technology; 
comprehensive product offerings; strong customer service; alliances, partnerships, and other business relationships; management and/or employee expertise; 
strength of scientific advisors; and reputation for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.   We also report the percentages of companies who 
do or do not change what they consider their distinguishing characteristics over time (e.g. The “yes to no” column under “BP to IPO” reflects the percentage of 
companies who report a given item as a distinguishing characteristic in the business plan but not at the IPO). 
 
 BP  IPO AR     BP  IPO AR   BP  IPO AR 
   All  firms       Biotechnology  firms   Non-biotechnology  firms 
Unique  product/technology  100 98  92    100  100 91    100  97  93 
Comprehensive  products  6  12  13    6 6  0   6 16  18 
Customer  service  8 16  26    0  6 9    13  22  32 
Alliances/partnerships  12 12 8    0  12 0    19  13 11  
Expertise  45  14  13   47 12  18   44 16  11 
Scientific  advisors  4  2  5   6 0  0   3 3  7 
Reputation  6  8  8   0 6  9   9 9  7 
 
Number  of  observations    49  49  39   17 17  11   32 32  28 
 
 BP  to  IPO     IPO  to  AR     BP  to  AR 
 
  Yes Yes No  No  Yes  Yes No  No  Yes  Yes No  No 
  to to to  to    to  to to  to  to  to to to 
 yes   no yes no yes   no yes no yes   no yes no 
 
Unique  product/technology  98  2 0  0  92  5 0  3  92  8 0 0 
Comprehensive  products  4  2  8 86  8 3  5 85  3 5  10  82 
Customer  service  8 0 8  84  15  5 10  69  8  3 18  72   
Alliances/partnerships  8  4  4 84  3 10  5 82  5 8  0  85 
Expertise  8  37  6 49  8 5  5 82  8 36  5  51 
Scientific  advisors  2 2 0  96  3  0 3  95  3  3 3 92 
Reputation  4 2 4  90  8  3 0  90  3  5 5 87   
 
Number  of  observations  49 49 49  49  39  39 39  39  39  39 39 39Table 5 
Assets and Technology 
 
Percent of companies that have patented technology, physical assets, alienable assets (either physical assets or patents), and proprietary intellectual property for 
49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.  We also report the percentages of companies for which these are or are not constant over time (e.g. 
The “yes to no” column under “BP to IPO” reflects the percentage of companies who report a given item as part of their assets in the business plan but not at the 
IPO). 
 
 BP IPO AR BP IPO AR BP IPO AR BP IPO AR BP IPO AR 
  All firms     Biotechnology firms  Non-biotechnology firms  Retail firms    Non-biotechnology/ 
                      Non-retail  firms 
Patents  29 49  62  53 76  91  16 34  50  0  0  0  32 55 71 
Physical  assets  18 27  38  6  6  9  25 38  50  100  100  100  9  18 29 
Alienable  assets  43 67  82  59 76  91  34 63  79  100  100  100  36 64 79 
Proprietary  IP  84 86  82  94 100  100  78 78  75  0  0  0  93 95 94 
 
Number  of  observations  49 49  39  17 17  11  32 32  28  5  5  5  44 44 34 
 
    All  firms     Biotechnology  firms   Non-biotechnology  firms 
    B P   t o   I P O      IPO  to  AR     BP  to  AR 
 
      Yes  Yes No  No  Yes Yes No  No  Yes Yes No  No 
      to  to to to    to to to to  to to to to 
    y e s    no yes no yes   no yes no yes   no yes no 
 
Patents      29  0  20 51  46 0  15 39  26 0  36 38 
Physical  assets      18  0 8 73  31  0 8 62  21  0 18  62 
Alienable  assets      43  0  24 33  69 0  13 18  44 0  38 18 
Proprietary  IP      84  0 2 14  82  0 0 18  79  0 3 18 
 
Number  of  observations      49  49 49 49  39 39 39 39  39 39 39 39 Table 6 
Growth Strategy 
 
Percent of companies that explicitly report the following as elements of their growth strategy for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public:  
increase market penetration or establish market or technology leadership, develop new products or upgrade existing products, develop new strategic alliances or 
other business partnerships, expand geographically, acquire other companies.   We also report the percentages of companies who do or do not change the 
elements of their strategies over time (e.g. The “yes to no” column under “BP to IPO” reflects the percentage of companies who report a given item as part of 
their growth strategy in the business plan but not at the IPO). 
 
 BP IPO AR     BP IPO AR    B P  IPO AR 
  All  firms       Biotechnology  firms    Non-biotechnology  firms 
Market  penetration/leadership  49 71  56    24  47 55  63  84 57 
New/upgraded  products  59 82  72    94  100  91  41  72 64  
Expand  geographically  20  43 21   0   6  0  31  63  29 
New  alliances/partnerships  29 59  51    47  71 64  19  53 46 
Acquisitions  2  22 28   0   29  27  3  19  29 
 
Number  of  observations  49 49  39    17  17 11  32  32 28 
  
 BP  to  IPO     IPO  to  AR     BP  to  AR 
 
  Yes Yes No  No  Yes Yes No  No  Yes  Yes No  No 
  to to to to    to to to to  to  to to to 
 yes   no yes no yes   no yes no yes   no yes no 
Market  penetration/leadership  47 2  24 27  49 21 8  23  36  15 21 28 
New/upgraded  products  53 6  29 12  64 15 8  13  51  5  21 23 
Expand  geographically  14 6  29 51  21 26 0  54  13  13 8  67   
New  alliances/partnerships  24  4 35  37  51  8 0 41  23  2 28  46 
Acquisitions  2  0  20 78  10 10 18 62  3  0  26 72   
 
Number  of  observations  49 49 49 49  39 39 39 39  39  39 39 39Table 7 
Customers 
 
Percent of companies that have customers at the business plan, IPO, and annual report for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.  We also 
report whether the customer base is primarily businesses or consumers, and whether the customer base broadens, narrows, or stays about the same over time. 
 
BP IPO AR   BP IPO AR BP IPO AR BP IPO AR BP IPO AR 
  All firms    Biotechnology firms  Non-biotechnology firms  Retail firms    Non-biotechnology, 
                  N o n - r e t a i l   f i r m s  
Has  customers  (%)  47 90 95  12 83 82  66 94 100  100  100  100  59 93 100 
Primarily  businesses  (%)  86 86 85  94 94 91  81 81 82  20 20 20  93 93 96 
Primarily  consumers  (%)  14 14 15  6  6  9  19 19 18  80 80 80  7  7  4   
 
Number  of  observations  49 49 39  17 17 11  32 32 28  5  5  5  27 27 23 
 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
  All firms      Biotechnology firms    Non-biotechnology firms 
Customer  base  similar  (%)  73 77 62  88 100  82  66 68 54   
Customer  base  broader  (%)  24 15 33  6  0  9  34 21 43 
Customer  base  narrower  (%)  2 8 5  5 0 9  0 11  4 





Percent of companies who have competitors at the business plan for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.  We also report the percent of 
companies whose competitor base broadens, narrows, or stays about the same over time. 
 
Number of observations: 49  Lists competitors as of business plan (%): 84 
 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
  All  firms      Biotechnology  firms   Non-biotechnology  firms 
Competitor  base  similar  (%)  63    79    56  47 82 36  72 79 64 
Competitor  base  broader  (%)  35    21    41  53 18 64  25 21 32   
Competitor  base  narrower  (%)  2    0    3  0 0 0  3 0 4 
Number  of  observations  49    39    39  17 11 11  32 28 28Table 9 
Strategic alliances and other business partnerships 
 
Percent of companies that explicitly mention strategic alliances or other business partnerships as elements 
of their business for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.   For those that do report 
alliances, we report the median, average, and standard deviation of the number of reported alliances or 
partnerships; the number and percent of alliances or partnerships that remain over time; and the number of 
new alliances or partnerships over time.   
 
 BP IPO AR   BP IPO AR BP IPO AR  
  All firms    Biotechnology firms  Non-biotechnology firms 
Alliances  mentioned  (%)  35 67 69  18 82 82  44 59 64 
 
Num.  Obs.  49 49 39  17 17 11  32 32 28 
 
Number reported alliances 
  All firms    Biotechnology firms  Non-biotechnology firms 
Median  2.0 3.0 4.0  2.0 3.0 4.0  2.0 3.0 6.5 
Average  2.2 3.3 5.4  2.0 3.1 4.0  2.3 3.5 7.1 
Standard  deviation  1.3 2.1 4.6  1.0 1.7 2.6  1.5 2.5 6.1 
 
Num.  Obs.  11 26 18  3  13 10  8  13 8 
 
 
    B P   t o   I P O  IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Number alliances still existing 
Median       1.0   1.0   1.0 
Average       1.0   1.6   0.7 
Standard  deviation     0.7   1.4   0.8 
 
N u m .   O b s .       9    1 4    7  
 
Percent alliances still existing 
Median       67   42   20 
A v e r a g e        6 0    4 6    3 9  
Standard  deviation     44   38   46 
Num  =  100%      4   3   2 
Num.  =  0%      2   3   3 
 
N u m .   O b s .       9    1 4    7  
 
Number new alliances 
Median       2.0   3.0   4.0   
Average       2.5   4.0   5.5 
Standard  deviation     2.2   3.8   4.6 
 
N u m .   O b s .       2 0    1 5    1 3Table 10 
Management 
 
Percent of companies whose top 5 managers include a chief executive officer (CEO), a chief technologist, scientist or similar (CTO), a chief financial officer 
(CFO) or similar, and a marketing or sales director or similar (CMO) for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public.  The table also reports 
whether a founder is the CEO or, if not, a director; the extent of executive turnover; and the backgrounds of the business plan management team. 
 
Panel A:  
 All  firms    Biotechnology  firms      Non-biotechnology  firms 
 BP   IPO AR      BP   IPO   AR     BP   IPO AR 
Has  a  CEO(%)  88    100  100      71   100   100      97   100  100     
Num.  Obs.  49    49  39      17   17   11    32   32  28   
 
CEO is a founder (%)  77    57  46      75    53    36      77    59  50 
Num.  Obs.  43    49  39      12   17   11    31   32  28 
 
A founder is a director if none  
is the CEO (%)  92    71  48      83    75    71      100    69  36 
Num.  Obs.  12    21  21      6   8   7     6   13  14 
 
A founder is a top 5 manager  
or a director                  100     92  72    100   94  82  100  94  68 
Num. Obs.                                     47       49  39    16    17  11  31  32  28 
 
Has a CFO or similar (%)  42    80  85      35    71    100      45    84  79 
Num.  Obs.  48    49  39      17   17   11    31   32  28 
 
Has a CMO or similar (%)  38    37  41      12    12    9      45    50  54   
Num.  Obs.      48    49  39      17   17   11    31   32  28 
 
Has a CTO or similar 
    (non-retail) (%)  77    77  47      76    82    55      77    74  43 
Num.  Obs.  43    44  34      17   17   11    26   27  23 




    General  mgmt Technical  mgmt Technical Marketing Finance 
Top 5 business plan      
executives’ background (%)  42      25         16          9          8 




    General  mgmt Technical  mgmt Technical Marketing Finance 
Top 5 business plan      
executives’ background (%)  26      42         27          1          4 




    General  mgmt Technical  mgmt Technical Marketing Finance 
Top 5 business plan      
executives’  background  (%)  50      16   10   13   11 




   All  firms      Biotechnology  firms       Non-biotechnology  firms 
   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
 
CEO  remains  the  same  (%)    84       59       50     92  64   56     81  57  48 
Num.  Obs.    43       39       36     12  11   9     31  28  27 
 
Next  4  top  execs  remaining  (%) 55       36       25     41  36   22     63  36  27 
Num.  Obs.    49       39       39     17  11   11     32  28  28 
 
Former CEO still at co. (%)    29        19        11      0  25    25      33  17  7 
Num.  Obs.    7       16       18     1  4   4     6  12  14 
 
Former  next  4  execs  still  at  co.  (%)  25     6      6      29  18    2     24  1  7 
Num. Obs.             41        38        42      14  11    14      27  27  28 Panel D: Departing founders/executives 
 
    All firms: departed between  Biotechnology firms: departed between    Non-biotech firms: departed between 
 
   BP  and  IPO   IPO  and  AR BP  and  IPO IPO  and  AR     BP  and  IPO IPO  and  AR 
 
Identified next job (%): 
 
Founders      50        45      50    50      50  43   
Num.  Obs.    6        15      2    4      4    11   
    
Non-founder  CEOs      0        60         100      0    50   
Num.  Obs.    1        5           1      1    4 
 
Non-founder  other  top  5     41        42      33    53      46  39 
Num.  Obs.    32        33      12    8      20  25   
 
Founded new company (%): 
 
Founders      17        10      50    0      0    14 
Num.  Obs.    6        15      2    4      4    11 
 
Non-founder  CEOs      0        0           0      0    0 
Num.  Obs.    1        5           1      1    4   
 
Non-founder  other  top  5     11        4        4    4      15  4 
Num.  Obs.    32        33      12    8      20  25 
 
Top executive of startup company (%): 
 
Founders      33        27      50    0      25  36 
Num.  Obs.    6        15      2    4      4    11 
 
Non-founder  CEOs      0        40         0      0    50 
Num.  Obs.    1        5           1      1    4 
 
Non-founder  other  top  5     36        36      20.8    40      45  35 
Num.  Obs.    32        33      12    8      20  25 
 
    Table 11 
Ownership 
 
Panel A reports common stock ownership of company founders (taken as a group), CEOs, and non-founder CEOs at the business plan, immediately before the 
(pre-) IPO, immediately after the (post-)IPO, and at the annual report, as well as percentage changes in these variables.  Percentage changes are from business 
plan to pre-IPO.  Ownership at the business plan is after the financing round.  Panel B summarizes the division of firm ownership pre-IPO.   Panel C summarizes 
the shares of net value, defined as pre-IPO value minus total consideration paid by all existing investors, owned by founders and executives of the firm, assumed 
that none of them paid consideration to the company.   
 
Panel A – Beneficial ownership of common stock   
 All  firms       Biotechnology  firms      Non-biotechnology  firms 
Founder(s) (%) 
     Pre-  Post-           Pre-  Post-          Pre-  Post- 
 BP   IPO IPO AR   BP   IPO IPO AR     BP   IPO IPO AR 
Median  28.9  12.4  8.8  5.3    28.9  4.3  3.5  5.1      31.7  13.1  10.3  5.3 
Average  36.0  14.6  11.2 7.2    34.4  11.4  8.6  8.0      36.7  16.4  12.6  6.8   
St.  dev.  25.4  12.4  9.7  7.5    30.8  12.7  9.5  9.2      23.6  12.1  9.7  7.0 
Num.  Obs.  31    49 49  37    9    17 17 10      22    32 32 27 
 
Founder(s)  percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  -45   -51    -77    -51   -49   -63.8      -38   -53  -86 
Average  -39   -54    -72    -42   -52   -64.1      -37   -55  -75 
St.  dev.  40   40    27    46   20   26.1     38   45  27 
Num.  Obs. 31   36    25    9   10   7      22   26  18 
 
CEO (%) 
     Pre- Post-          Pre-  Post-          Pre-  Post- 
 BP   IPO IPO AR   BP   IPO IPO AR     BP IPO IPO AR 
Median  15.9  6.7   5.4  3.6    6.8   4.3    3.1  3.2      17.4  8.0    6.4  3.8 
Average  20.1    9.8    7.5 5.7    15.5    8.2    6.2 6.1      22.0  10.6    8.2 5.6  
St.  dev.  15.8  9.0   7.0  6.6    14   9.9    7.1  8.7      16.5  8.6    6.9  5.9 
Num.  Obs.  27    49    49 38    8    17    17 10      19 32    32 28 
 
CEO  percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  -38   -50    -78    -19   -36   -72.2      -38   -55  -79 
Average  -31   -40    -69    -15   -48   -62.9      -38   -37  -71 
St.  dev.  37   70    26    45   27   32.8     32   80  23 
Num.  Obs. 27   38    23    8   10   7      19   28  16 Table 11 (continued) 
 All  firms       Biotechnology  firms      Non-biotechnology  firms 
Non-founder CEO (%) 
     Pre-  Post-           Pre-  Post-          Pre-  Post- 
 BP   IPO IPO AR   BP   IPO IPO AR     BP   IPO IPO AR 
Median  5.5   4.2    3.0 1.7    4.2   3.6    2.8  1.2     6.5   6.6    5.0  2.0 
Average  5.1   5.0    4.0 1.9    4.2   3.5    2.7  1.6     5.5   6.0    4.8  2.1 
St.  dev.  2.0   3.1    2.6 1.4    0.7   1.2    0.9  1.3     2.4   3.5    2.9  1.4 
Num.  Obs.  6   21    21  20    2   8    8    6     4   13    13  14 
 
Non-founder CEO percentage change 
 BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR   BP to AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR   BP  to  IPO IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Median  -30   -48    -72    -20   -33   -86     -30   -56  -70 
Average  -23   -56    -80    -20   -45   -86     -24   -60  -76 
St.  dev.  27   28    19    50   37   20    20   24  21 
Num.  Obs.  6   14    5    2   4   2     4   10  3 
 
Panel B – Division of ownership pre-IPO (%) 
Non-  Non-founder     All  executive    Founder  not 
    founder  other  top      officers  and  Founders  +  a  mgr:   Founder  $ 
  Founders CEO 5  managers VCs Partners Others directors   top 5 mgrs top  5  mgrs pre-IPO  ($M) 
 
All firms 
Median   12.4   4.2  2.2   52.6  0.0  22.7  52.0   16.3   6.2   17.5 
Average   14.6   5.0  3.5   53.0  3.8  23.1  55   20.3   6.0   103.3 
St.  dev.   12.4   3.1  4.4   17.1  8.2  13.0  21.9   13.1   3.4   398.5 
Num.  Obs.  49   21 49   49 49 49 49   49   6    49 
 
Biotechnology firms 
Median    4.3   3.6 1.6   52.6  0.0 28.0  48.3    8.0   6.1   11.7 
Average   11.4   3.5  2.2   51.4  4.7  28.8  49.7   15.2   6.1   29.7 
St.  dev.   12.7   1.2  1.7   16.4  7.8  12.7  17.2   12.5   3.6   39.2 
Num.  Obs.  17   8  17   17 17 17 17   17   2    17 
 
Non-biotechnology firms   
Median   13.1   6.6  2.8   54.1  0.0  20.5  56.0   18.9   6.2   21.3 
Average   16.4   6.0  4.2   53.9  3.3  20.1  57.9   23.0   6.0   142.4 
St.  dev.   12.1   3.5  5.2   17.6  8.5  12.3  23.8   12.7   3.9   490.4 
Num.  Obs.  32   13 32   32 32 32 32   32   4    32 
   
Panel C – Founder and executive shares of pre-IPO net value (%)  
 
Non-  Non-founder    Founder  not 
    founder  other  top   Founders  +  a  mgr: 
  Founders CEO 5  managers top  5  mgrs top  5  mgrs  
 
All firms 
Median   14.4   5.3  3.1   20.6   9.8   
Average   19.1   6.6  4.4   26.5   9.5   
St.  dev.   18.1   3.9  5.0   19.4   4.5   
Num.  Obs.  48   21 48   48   6   
 
Biotechnology firms 
Median   8.7   4.8  2.9   15.5   11.7   
Average   14.6   5.3  3.2   20.4   11.7   
St.  dev.   14.6   2.3  2.4   13.8   3.4   
Num.  Obs.  16   8  16   16   2   
 
Non-biotechnology firms   
 
Median   16.7   7.8  3.5   21.2   8.4 
Average   21.4   7.5  5.1   29.5   8.3 
St.  dev.   19.5   4.5  5.9   21.2   4.9   
Num.  Obs.  32   13 32   32   4   
  Table 12 
 Board of Directors 
 
Summary statistics on the size, composition, and turnover of the boards of directors at the business plan (BP), IPO, 
and annual report (AR) for 49 VC-financed companies that subsequently went public. 
 
 
BP IPO AR    
Board Size    
 
Median    5.0 7.0 7.0    
Average    5.0 6.9 6.8    
St.  dev.   1.3  1.4  1.5      
 
Num.  Obs.  29 49 39    
 
Number Insiders  
 
Median    2.0 2.0 2.0    
Average    2.2 1.9 1.8 
St.  dev.    1.0 0.8 0.8 
 
Num.  Obs.  28 48 39 
 
Number VCs    
 
Median    2.0 3.0 1.0    
Average    1.6 2.8 1.7    
St.  dev.    1.2 1.2 1.6    
 
Num.  Obs.  28 48 39    
 
Number non-VC outsiders    
  
Median    1.0 2.0 3.0  
Average    1.3 2.2 3.2    
St.  dev.    1.3 1.4 1.1    
 
Num.  Obs.  28 48 39    
 
 
   B P   t o   I P O  IPO  to  AR BP  to  AR 
Percent directors remaining     71   57   40  
 
Num.  Obs.      29   39   21 
   
 
Table 13 
 Determinants of Founder remaining CEO at the IPO or first Annual Report 
 
Probit regressions of the likelihood of the founder remaining CEO of the company either at IPO or at the first annual 
report after going public.  Independent variables are:   ‘Alienable assets at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value 
of one if the firm has either significant physical assets or patents at the time of the business plan (BP).  ‘Physical 
assets at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has significant physical assets at the time of the 
BP.  ‘Patents at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has patents at the time of the BP.  ‘Non-
pat. IP at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has no patents but has proprietary intellectual 
property at the time of BP.  ‘Age (months) at BP’ is the age of the firm at the time of the BP in months.  ‘Fdr 
ownership at BP’ is the founder’s ownership stake in percent at the time of the BP.  Reported coefficients are 
marginal effects of independent variables.  .  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard standard errors in parentheses.  




Panel A:  Founder remains CEO at the IPO. 
 
  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE) 
Alienable assets at BP  -0.148  (0.150)             
Physical assets at BP      -0.443  (0.198)**  -0.700 (0.164)***  -0.971 (0.048)*** 
Patents at BP      -0.069  (0.169)  -0.529 (0.235)**  -0.814 (0.194)*** 
Non-pat. IP at BP          -0.504  (0.194)***  -0.698  (0.167)*** 
Age  (months)  at  BP  0.002 (0.002)  0.005 (0.003)*  0.007 (0.003)**  0.008 (0.003)** 
Fdr  ownership  at  BP           0.014 (0.005)** 
Constant  0.118 (0.270)  0.009 (0.273)  1.165 (0.567)**  0.711 (0.839) 
              
Number of obs.  49    49    49    30   
Pseudo R-squared  0.03    0.07    0.12    0.38   
 
 
Panel B:  Founder remains CEO at the first Annual Report. 
 
  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE) 
Tangible assets at BP  -0.518  (0.195)***             
Physical assets at BP      -0.506  (0.252)**  -0.642 (0.232)***  -0.835 (0.165)*** 
Patents at BP      -0.359  (0.195)*  -0.599 (0.235)**  -0.599 (0.262)** 
Non-pat.  IP  at  BP         -0.355 (0.247)  -0.568 (0.245)** 
Age  (months)  at  BP  0.014 (0.004)**  0.012 (0.005)**  0.014 (0.006)**  0.014 (0.005)*** 
Fdr  ownership  at  BP           0.010 (0.005)** 
Constant -0.543  (0.326)*  -0.665  (0.348)*  -0.012  (0.605)      -0.445  (0.843) 
              
Number  of  obs.  39   39    39   26   
Pseudo  R-squared  0.27   0.25    0.28   0.40   
 Table 14 
 Determinants of Founder ownership pre- IPO  
  
OLS regressions of the determinants of founder pre-IPO ownership percentage.  Independent variables are ‘Tangible 
assets at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has either significant physical assets or patents 
at the time of the business plan (BP).  ‘Physical assets at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm 
has significant physical assets at the time of the BP.  ‘Patents at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the firm has patents at the time of the BP.  ‘Non-pat. IP at BP’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
firm has no patents but has proprietary intellectual property at the time of BP.  ‘Age (months) at BP’ is the age of the 
firm at the time of the BP in months.  ‘Fdr ownership at BP’ is the founder’s ownership stake in percent at the time 
of the BP.  Probit coefficients are reported, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.  */**/*** 





  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE)  Coeff. (STDE) 
Tangible assets at 
BP  -0.210 (3.650)       
Physical assets at 
BP     5.771 (5.541)  3.288 (6.555) 
Patents  at  BP     -5.561 (3.591)  -8.997 (5.036)* 
Non-pat.  IP  at  BP        -4.218 (5.301) 
Age  (months)  at  BP  0.049 (0.039)  0.031 (0.033)  0.040 (0.038) 
Constant 12.738  (2.479)***  13.913 (2.384)*** 17.317 (4.341)*** 
          
Number  of  obs.  49   49   49   
R-squared  0.04   0.12   0.13   
 
 
 